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SPACE BORNE NUCLEAR POWER SOURCES-THE
STATUS OF THEIR REGULATION
MICHAEL S. STRAUBEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The future of space exploration, space commercialization, and
space militarization may depend upon the development of new and
more powerful space borne energy sources. While research continues
in the areas of solar and chemical energy systems, some experts
believe that nuclear power will be the ultimate solution. Unfortunately,
though, the use of nuclear power sources (NPS) presents many safety
problems and therefore many legal issues. So far most of these issues
have gone unaddressed by international law.
This article attempts to expose those legal issues by reviewing
the history of NPS use, NPS technology, the hazards created by NPS
use, the current international law regulating NPS use, and the cur-
rent efforts within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space to update international law regarding NPS use. Follow-
ing the survey a structure for effective regulatory machinery is
suggested.
II. THE NEED TO REGULATE
After a slow period during the mid- to late- 1970s, the western
world has again developed an interest in space exploration. Much of
this excitement has been generated by the commercial possibilities
space exploration holds. For example, results from recent protein
crystal growth experiments conducted aboard the space shuttle could
lead to powerful new anticancer drugs.'
To take advantage of these new commercial opportunities, as well
as some military opportunities, more reliable and powerful energy
sources must be developed. It is estimated that by the mid-1990s the
planned United States space station will required upwards of 400
kilowatts of power to operate the commercial materials processing
then one of the station's many functions.2 Also, some aspects of the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University.
1. Covault, Shuttle Crystal Growth Tests Could Advance Cancer Research,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 25, 1985, at 18.
2. Space Station Nuclear Power Studied, SPACE Bus. NEWS, Jan. 14, 1985, at 8.
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Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program,
such as space based radar and directed energy weapons, will require
reliable sources of kilowatts and even megajoules of energy.'
One energy source, nuclear power, is viewed by many as the
answer to these needs. Nuclear power has many advantages when
compared to other sources now in use: it is reliable, it is independent
of the sun, it is relatively light, it has a long life, and it is capable
of supplying greater quantities of heat and energy.4 Foreseeing the
need for a more powerful energy source, the United States Govern-
ment has initiated a program, dubbed SP-100, to produce a nuclear
power source (NPS) for space use. Managed by the SDI office, it is
hoped that the SP-100 program will produce an NPS capable of pro-
viding hundreds of kilowatts and eventually multi-megawatts of
power.' Although the program is managed by the military, private
industry has also expressed interest in using NPSs in space.'
A. The History of NPS Use
Between June, 1961, and August, 1985, the United States
launched twenty-four nuclear power sources7 and the Soviet Union
launched at least twenty-two.' Twenty-three of the twenty-four U.S.
launches were radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and one
was a nuclear reactor. All of the Soviet launches are believed to be
reconnaissance satellites powered by nuclear reactors.' RTGs have
3. Space Power Project Moves to SDI Offwe, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 29, 1984, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Space Power Moves to SDI].
4. W. Wirin, The Sky is Falling-Managing Space Objects 3 (Oct. 8-13, 1984)
(a report presented at the XXXV Congress of the International Astronautical Federa-
tion Colloquium on Cooperation in Space).
5. Space Power Moves to SDI, supra note 3, at 19.
6. Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc., a firm under contract with the Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory to explore NPS application has been approached by an unidentified
company about using an NPS on a space processing platform. Booz-Allen Uncovers
Nuclear Mission, SPACE Bus. NEWS, Jan. 28, 1985, at 2, 3.
7. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration hopes to launch three
NPSs aboard a May, 1986, space shuttle mission. Two of the NPSs will power the
Galileo Jupiter probe mission and one NPS will be aboard the European Ulysses solar-
polar mission. Necessary White House approval has not yet been given to proposed
launches because of the lengthy process required to certify that the NPSs will survive
a launch accident. Washington Roundup, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 28, 1985,
at 17.
8. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 3; Soviet Nuclear-Powered Satellite Boosts Naval
Surveillance Capability, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 19, 1985, at 18
[hereinafter cited as Soviet Satellite].
9. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 3. See also Soviet Satellite, supra note 7, at 18.
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been used by the United States to power and heat navigational
satellites, communication satellites, meterological satellites, lunar mis-
sion equipment, Mars mission equipment, and planetary explorers.'0
The only nuclear reactor launched by the United States was aboard
the experimental Snapshot spacecraft in 1965.11
Of the forty-six known launches of NPSs, five have failed to reach
orbit or remain outside the earth's atmosphere. Three of the five were
United State's NPS missions. The first, a Navy Transit-5BN-3 naviga-
tion satellite, failed to reach earth orbit and burned upon reentry over
the Indian Ocean east of Africa. 2 Its RTG was vaporized during re-
entry, releasing 17,000 curies of radioactive plutonium into the
stratosphere.'3 High altitude atmospheric sampling done by the U.S.
indicated that the radiation was dispersed world-wide.'
The other two U.S. NPS accidents did not release radioactive
material into the atmosphere. In 1968 the launch of a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Nimbus B-1
meteorological satellite was aborted at an altitude of 100,000 feet when
a guidance error developed. The spacecraft and its RTGs fell into the
Santa Barbara channel where they were recovered intact.'5 The Apollo
13 mission, which was aborted on its way to the moon in April of
1970, carried lunar experiments powered by RTGs. After reentering
over the South Pacific, the nuclear fuel cask sank 20,000 feet to the
bottom of the Tonga Trench where it remains today. 6
The Soviet space program has experienced two NPS accidents:
COSMOS 954 in 1978 and COSMOS 1402 in 1983. It is the COSMOS
954 accident which generated international concern over NPS use in
outer space.
On January 24, 1978, COSMOS 954 entered the atmosphere above
Canada's Northwest Territories and disintegrated over the Great Slave
Lake. Canadian and American search parties were immediately dis-
10. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 9 (summary of space nuclear power systems
launched by the United States).
11. Id.
12. Uses of Radio-active (nuclear) Materials by the United States of America
for Space Power Generation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.102 (1978) (a report submitted by
the United States to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space)
[hereinafter cited as Uses of Radio-active Materials by the United States].
13. Dembling, COSMOS 954 and the Space Treaties, 6 J. SPACE L. 129, 131
(1978).
14. Uses of Radio-active Materials by the United States, supra note 12, at 5.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id.
1986]
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patched to search for debris and to determine if radioactive fallout
was present. 7 Operation Morninglight, the name given the clean up
operation by the U.S., continued for over three months, until April
17, 1978. During operation Morninglight, radioactive material was
detected over a 124,000 square kilometer area of the Northwest Ter-
ritories. Fortunately the area is sparsely populated and no personal
injuries occurred. The clean up, including the removal of contaminated
flora and soil, cost $13,970,143.66 (CDN).18
Launched on September 18, 1977, COSMOS 954 was officially
described by the Soviet Union as an outer space exploration satellite.
The White House, however, described it as an ocean surveillance
satellite designed to track warships. COSMOS 954 had been one of
two satellites in a 150 mile high orbit that provided surveillance
coverage for almost two-thirds of the earth every two weeks. 9 The
COSMOS type of ocean surveillance satellite, which by this time had
been used for some time, generally remained in its 150 mile high orbit
for no more than two months.' At the end of its two month life,
COSMOS satellites were normally raised to a 600 mile high orbit.2'
There the satellites and their nuclear reactors would remain for hun-
dreds of years.' Unfortunately, this did not happen with COSMOS
954. In late December of 1977 an attempt to fire COSMOS 954's
engines failed. Its orbit began to decay and shortly thereafter
COSMOS 954 crashed into Northern Canada.23
Weighing about five tons, COSMOS 954 was equipped with an
active radar system. Such a radar system requires substantial elec-
trical power. That electrical power was supplied by a 100 kilowatt
nuclear reactor stocked with an estimated fifty kilograms of enriched
uranium 235.4 If the reactor was turned on shortly after launch in
September, and turned off around December 25th of the same year,
then it would have produced approximately 100,000 curies of the fission
products strontium 90, cesium 137, and iodine 131.25
No warning of COSMOS 954's possible reentry was given by the
Soviet Union. The first communication between Canada and the Soviet
17. Demnbling, supra note 13, at 129.
18. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Dembling, supra note 13, at 129.




24. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 2.
25. Dembling, supra note 13, at 130.
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Union took place on January 24, 1978, when the Canadian Department
of External Affairs asked the Soviet Ambassador whether the satellite
carried an NPS and expressed surprise that the Canadian Govern-
ment had not been given prior warning.' In response, the Soviet Union
said that it had expected COSMOS 954 to burn completely in the
earth's atmosphere and reenter over the Aleutian Islands where little
local pollution would result.'
Although Canada's total cost for the search and clean up of
COSMOS 954 was $13,970,143.66 (CND), Canada decided to only claim
$6,941,174.70 (CND) from the Soviet Union.28 This lower amount
represented those costs which Canada would not have incurred if the
incident had not happened (e.g., Canada did not claim the salaries of
military personnel involved in the clean up).' The Soviet Union ob-
jected to this lower amount though. It asserted that Canada had taken
measures beyond what was necessary and that it had a right to partici-
pate in the search and recovery.3 On November 21, 1980, after three
negotiating sessions, the Soviet Union agreed to pay Canada $3,000,000
as a full and final settlement. 31
The second Soviet NPS accident was not as serious. COSMOS
1402, another in the COSMOS series of ocean surveillance satellites,
reentered the atmosphere over the Indian Ocean on January 23, 1983,
and came down off the coast of Argentina on February 7, 1983.' With
this incident TASS, the official Soviet News Agency, gave advanced
warning of the satellite's likely reentry on January 15, 1983.3 TASS
also admitted that COSMOS 1402 was powered by a nuclear reactor
containing uranium 238 enriched with uranium 235 and encased in a
beryllium reflector.' Unlike COSMOS 954, COSMOS 1402 was designed
to separate into three pieces.m One of the three pieces, the nuclear
reactor, was to be boosted to a higher orbit where it would remain
for some time. This did not happen, but fortunately no damage was
caused by COSMOS 1402's reentry.'
26. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 1.
27. Id.
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B. Technical Background
Two types of nuclear power sources have been launched:
radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), and nuclear reactors.
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
RTGs contain radionuclide fuels, generally plutonium 238 or
plutonium 210, surrounded by an energy conversion system. As the
radioisotope spontaneously decays, ionizing radiation is absorbed as
heat and then converted to electricity. 7 The plutonium fuel has a half-
life of eighty-seven and one-half years and within existing NPSs, pro-
duces from 1800 to 280,000 curies."
RTGs generally produce twenty-five to thirty watts of electrical
energy and 500 watts of heat from about one kilogram of plutonium.
So far the energy conversion efficiency rate is only about five percent.
Systems with an efficiency rate of from eighteen to thirty percent,
which can produce up to 1000 watts, are under development.3' While
an RTG's operating life is only a few hundred hours, the short half
life and alpha emission decay scheme of its plutonium fuel allows
relatively little shielding, thus making it light and reliable."
Nuclear Reactors
The controlled fission of enriched uranium 235 creates the ther-
mal energy produced by a nuclear reactor. The thermal energy is cap-
tured by reflector material and converted into electrical power. 1 More
complicated than RTGs, nuclear reactors carry between five and one
hundred kilograms of uranium 235 fuel. The half life of uranium 235
is 713 million years. 2
Nuclear reactors are capable of producing significantly more
energy than RTGs. Project SP-100 is attempting to create a reactor
capable of producing 100 kilowatts of power. Reactors, however, pro-
duce more radiation than RTGs and therefore require added protec-
37. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in
Outer Space on the Work of Its Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.126 (1981)
(submitted to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) (hereinafter
cited as Report of the Working Group-Third Session].
38. C. CHRISTOL. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 765 (1982).
39. Jasentuliyana, A Perspective of the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer
Space, 6 ANNUALS AIR & SPACE L. 519, 523 n.12 (1979).
40. Uses of Radio-active Material by the United States, supra note 12, at 4.
41. Report of the working Group-Third Session, supra note 37, at 2.
42. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 38, at 765.
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tive measures. For example, a reactor system envisioned for the U.S.
Space Station would require either thirty-five to forty-five metric tons
of shielding for an onboard reactor, or a tethering system with twelve
to twenty metric tons of shielding for a reactor in tow, or a free-
flying reactor some 700 kilometers away able to beam its power to
the station."3
C. Hazards
The hazards presented by an NPS to the terrestrial and extra-
terrestrial environment are primarily limited to radiological hazards."
The severity of the danger created by a malfunctioning NPS depends
on the type of NPS in use, the prelaunch precautions taken, the
measures taken when reentry is likely, and the location of reentry.
It is unlikely that an NPS would explode in space.'" Unless the
NPS is sent into deep space, a satellite carrying an NPS will inevitably
reenter the earth's environment. The greatest danger is obviously
presented by the uncontrolled reentry of an NPS which results in
the release of radioactive material. Depending on the amount and loca-
tion of a release, animals and humans can be harmed by the inhala-
tion, ingestion, or external contact of radioactive material."
The most dangerous NPS accident is the uncontrolled reentry
of a nuclear reactor which has failed to respond to a remote control
shut down order. A nuclear reactor and its uranium 235 fuel, before
the reactor is activated, is relatively safe when compared to the prod-
ucts of the fission process. 7 When reentry is inevitable the safety
philosophy has been to burn and disperse the radioactive material
in the upper atmosphere.'8 Should this happen, the resulting radioac-
tive material would descend globally over a period of several years.
Individually, the dose would not exceed the recommended limits set
by the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP)
for human exposure.'9 Collectively, though, the dose would be
undesirable.'
43. Space Station Nuclear Power Studied, SPACE Bus. NEWS, Jan. 14, 1985, at 8.
44. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 528.
45. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 38, at 766.
46. See, e.g., Dembling, supra note 13, at 130 (the milk of cows that have eaten
contaminated grass is often destroyed).
47. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 530.
48. Id. at 524.
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id.
19861
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The danger from a reentering NPS can be greatly reduced if
the exact landing location could be calculated ahead of time. Unfor-
tunately, even though the United States conducts extensive
surveillance of space objects, technology has not progressed to the
point where exact predictions can be made." The earth's atmosphere
is not uniform and objects often "skip" when reentering.' A miscalcula-
tion of the reentry time by one minute can cause an error of 300
miles."
The United States North American Aerospace Defense Command
tracks all man-made objects in earth's orbit. The Command's Space
Surveillance Center keeps a record of an object's position and through
the Tracking Impact Prediction (TIP) program, attention is focused
on those objects which may reenter the atmosphere within twenty
days.' Even with all of this attention the error factor of TIP calcula-
tions is plus or minus twenty percent." With the reentry of COSMOS
1402, the location of its landing could not be reasonably predicted until
two hours before reentry, and no official statement was given because
of this lack of absolute certainty."
Still, the current probability of an NPS reentering the earth's
atmosphere and landing in a populated area is not very high. 7 With
three-quarters of the earth's surface consisting of deep ocean, the odds
are against an NPS landing in a populated area.' Further, it is
estimated that it would take about 10,000 NPS missions, as they are
used today, over a ten year period, to create the same radiation hazard
to the earth's population as already exists from all of the nuclear
weapons tests conducted since 1945."9
Nonetheless, with the expected increase in NPS use, a danger
does exist. With this technical background, the next step is to assess
the state of the law regulating the use of NPS's in outer space.
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW
To present a clear and uncluttered survey of the law covering
nuclear power use in outer space, the following discussion will be first






57. Hosenball, Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 119 (1979).
58. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 531.
59. Id. at 530 n.34.
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divided into the two major categories that have naturally developed:
(1) pre-accident law, and (2) post-accident law (liability). Within these
major categories the discussion will be further divided into the areas
of space law and environmental law. Because there is no one source
of international law governing NPS use, such as a multilateral con-




Three multilateral space conventions and the Chicago Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation in some way regulate pre-accident
NPS use.
(a) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)'
Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that outer space
shall be free for exploration and use, on the basis of equality, in ac-
cordance with international law and that exploration "shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind . . ."" Therefore,
there exists the basic right to use outer space in any fashion which
does not violate international law or harm mankind.
Under Article 9, states shall avoid uses which contaminate outer
space and interfere with other states' use of outer space. Should a
state "have reason to believe that an activity ... would cause poten-
tially harmful interference . . . it shall undertake appropriate interna-
tional consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experi-
ment." As designed and intended, an NPS does not constitute a harmful
contamination of outer space or a roadblock to the use of outer space.
Strictly reading Article 9, then, consultation prior to launch does not
appear necessary.
When an NPS is damaged or malfunctions, Article 9 clearly re-
quires consulation if it presents a threat to the outer space environ-
ment. The absence in Article 9 of a reference to potential harm to
60. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, United States-United Kingdom-U.S.S.R., 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
61. Outer Space Treaty, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. at 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
62. Outer Space Treaty, art. 9, 18 U.S.T. at 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
1986]
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the earth's environment is curious. This omission would seem to excuse
notice when only the earth's environment is at risk. However, a per-
suasive argument can be made that the requirement in Article 9 that
parties to the Treaty shall conduct their outer space activities "with
due regard to the corresponding interest of all other States Parties
to the Treaty"' obliges consultation when there is a potential for harm
to the earth's environment.
(b) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Registration Convention)"
Article 4 of the Registration Convention supplements and ex-
pands upon Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty. Although it is more
detailed, Article 4 of the Registration Convention contains the same
basic loopholes as Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty.
A launching state must report to the U.N. Secretary-General the
date, territory of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general func-
tion of the space object launched. Such a report need only be done
"as soon as practicable."' These reporting requirements only affect
NPS use if the launching state wishes them to. Because only the
general function, and not the power source, need be reported, other
nations are not put on notice of an NPS's use unless the launching
state exceeds the bare requirements and includes details of the power
source used.
(c) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty)"
The Moon Treaty, which came into force on July 11, 1984, con-
tains the most specific regulation of NPS use to be found in the space
treaties. The Moon Treaty's importance and place among the other
widely accepted space treaties is in doubt though. Because of the
Treaty's controversial language concerning the moon's natural
resources 7 the space capable nations have not yet ratified it. Without
their ratification, the Moon Treaty's impact on space activities is
questionable.
63. Id.
64. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
65. Registration Convention, art. 4, 28 U.S.T. at 699, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
66. G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
67. Although there is disagreement over the interpretation of Article 11 of
the Moon Treaty, there is a considerable body of opinion that Article 11 effectively
prohibits the exploitation of the moon's natural resources by anyone other than the
international regime envisioned by Article 11. Moon Treaty, art. 11, G.A. Res. 34/68,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (1979).
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As it concerns the moon's environment, the Moon Treaty contains
several relevant provisions. Paragraph one of Article 7 obligates states
to avoid disruption of the moon's environment by the introduction
of contaminating "extra-environmental matter or otherwise."" Article
7, like Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty, creates a duty to be
careful. Thus, when using NPSs on the moon, states must take
measures to avoid the release of radioactive material.
Paragraph two of Article 7 is the most significant for NPS use.
States, "to the maximum extent feasible," 9 must notify, in advance,
the U.N. Secretary-General of all placements of radioactive material
on the moon and the purpose of the placement. This provision
significantly expands the information required by the Outer Space
Treaty and Registration Convention. Strangely, Article 7 of the Moon
Treaty does not oblige the Secretary-General to pass the information
on to the U.N. membership. It is not clear whether the Moon Treaty's
preamble reference to the Outer Space Treaty incorporates Article
11 of the Outer Space Treaty and thereby the Secretary-General's
obligation to disseminate reported information. Without the dissemina-
tion of information there appears to be little purpose in the reporting
requirements though.
The second sentence of paragraph one in Article 7 presents an
interpretation problem. The majority of the sentence is straightfor-
ward and clear: "States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harm-
fully affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction
of extraterrestrial matter .. .""o But the last two words, "or other-
wise," of that sentence, appear to greatly expand a state's obligation
to avoid harming the terrestrial environment. There is no way to
predict how much this expands a state's obligation. It is enough at
this point to take note of it.
Article 5 of the Moon Treaty holds several notice requirements
that indirectly affect the use of NPSs. The first notice provision, in
paragraph one, follows the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty
and Registration Convention. States must inform the Secretary-
General "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable" of their moon
activities." "As soon as possible after launching" the Secretary-General
68. Moon Treaty, art. 7, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
77, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Moon Treaty, art. 5, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
77, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
1986]
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is to be informed of the time, purpose, location, orbital parameters,
and duration of a moon mission. 2
The second notice provision of Article 5, found in paragraph two,
requires bilateral pre-launch information exchange when two moon
missions will be operating in close proximity. Also broadly worded,
this provision requires the exchange of mission timing and plans for
operation. Whether plans for operation includes the use of an NPS
remains to be seen.
The remaining provisions of the Moon Treaty only slightly effect
NPS use. Article 4, paragraph two, requests cooperation and mutual
assistance among states in the moon's use. Article 12, paragraph three,
provides that in the event of a life threatening emergency, States
Parties may use another Party's equipment. Article 13 requires notice
to the Secretary-General of an unintended landing on the moon. These
three provisions, particularly Article 12, under unique circumstances
may effect the way in which an NPS is used. For instance, might
Article 12 permit another state to shut down an NPS that is life
threatening?
(d) Convention of International Civil Aviation (Chicago Conven-
tion)7 -Annex 18
Annex 18 to the Chicago Convention is titled "The Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air." It contains international standards and
recommended practices adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention.
Under the provisions of the Chicago Convention, international stan-
dards are regulations recognized as necessary for the safety of interna-
tional air navigation. International standards are binding upon parties
to the Chicago Convention unless notification of a difference (inability
to comply) is submitted to the ICAO Council. Recommended practices
are similar to international standards in function, but are not binding,
and notification of a difference is not mandatory but encouraged.
Chapter 4, section .1, of Annex 18 forbids the transport of
dangerous goods by air unless the safety procedures detailed in it
are followed. Radioactive material is listed as a dangerous good. 4
72. Id.
73. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.(2) 1180,
3 Bevans 944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
74. The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods By Air, ICAO Annex 18, sec.
3.1, ICAO Order No. 418004 (1st ed. Jan., 1983).
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Therefore, nuclear material transported by air must be done accord-
ing to the requirements of the Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (an ICAO document incorporated
by reference to Annex 18),"5 and must meet the other miscellaneous
requirements of Annex 18. For example, section 8.7.4 reads: "packages
of radioactive material . . . shall be separated from persons, live
animals and undeveloped photographic film according to the separa-
tion distances tabulated in the Technical Instructions."7
Whether the regulations of Annex 18 apply to the use of NPS
is not clear. The Chicago Convention does not contain unequivocal
terms of application. Article 3 has the only language of application
which reads: "This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft
and shall not be applicable to state aircraft."" From Article 3 it would
appear that the Chicago Convention applies to vehicles classified as
aircraft and not to the physical territory classified as air space."8
Therefore, whether Annex 18 coverage extends to the civil use of
an NPS in outer space depends on whether the vehicle it is
transported in or that it powers can be categorized as an aircraft.
That question is beyond the scope of this paper. It is enough here
to point out that the Space Transport System has both the capacity
to transport an NPS and the capability to return to earth as an
aircraft.
(e) United National General Assembly Resolutions
United Nation General Assembly resolutions, though not listed
as a source of international law by Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice,"9 at times play a formative role in the
development of international law. To that extent General Assembly
Resolution 33/16 of November 10, 1978, might become important.' That
resolution, among other things, requests that launching states inform
those states at risk of the possible reentry of an NPS. However, con-
75. U.N. Doc. No. 9234-AN/905.
76. ICAO Annex 18, sec. 8.7.4.
77. Chicago Convention, art. 3, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. (2) 1180, 3 Bevans 944,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
78. ICAO Annex 7 further defines aircraft covered by the Chicago Conven-
tion. However, it is of no help in determining whether a civilian shuttle system is
covered by the Chicago Convention. This is particularly so if the plan to have a shuttle-
type craft take off as an ordinary aircraft is realized. Aircraft Nationality and Registra-
tion Marks, ICAO Order No. 407007 (4th ed. July, 1981).
79. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933.
80. G.A. Res. A/33/16, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) 66, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
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sidering the present technical difficulties in predicting the exact loca-
tion of a space object's point of reentry and the secrecy surrounding
the military use of some NPSs, Resolution 33/16 will have difficulty
gaining the legally binding status that some other General Assembly
resolutions have achieved.81
2. Environmental Law
Because nuclear power by its nature presents a potential for en-
vironmental harm, environmental law plays a role in the regulation
of NPS use. As will be seen, just as with space law, international
environmental law does not contain specific regulation of NPS use.
(a) Convention on the High Seas 2
Article 25 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, in its first
paragraph, mandates that every state shall take measures to prevent
pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste. In doing
so, states shall take into account the regulations of competent inter-
national organizations. The competent international organization in this
instance is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).' Further,
paragraph two of Article 25 requires cooperation between all states
and "the competent international organization" to prevent pollution
of the seas and air space above from radioactive materials.' Conse-
quently, should a launching state intend to disperse the radioactive
waste of an NPS into the air space above the open seas, as has hap-
pened, IAEA standards and regulations must be followed. Also, if
there is a possibility that an NPS will return to earth and land in
the open seas, IAEA standards must be met.
(b) The International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA is an autonomous organization associated with the
United Nations. It was enacted by statute in 1957.5 Its primary pur-
81. A few widely supported United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
have come to be accepted as declaratory of customary international law. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is often thought to have obtained this legal status. Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948).
82. Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, opened for registration Apr.
29-Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
83. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 542 n.78.
84. Convention on the High Seas, art. 25, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 520
(1958).
85. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature
Oct. 26, 1956-Jan. 24, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, amended
October 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334 thereinafter cited
as IAEA Statute].
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pose is to promote the peaceful and safe use of atomic energy. The
IAEA is perhaps best known for providing atomic material, technology,
equipment, and inspection services to those states which agree to abide
by IAEA standards and regulations."
Called the Safety Series, the IAEA has created a set of stan-
dards and regulations for the safe management of radioactive material.
Though not binding by terms of the IAEA statute, Safety Series stan-
dards and regulations are applicable to NPS use as described in the
immediately above section, "(a) Convention on the High Seas." Some
of the IAEA Safety Series publications relevant to NPS use include:
No. 5, Radioactive Waste Disposal in the the Sea; No. 6, Regulations
for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials; and, No. 12 Management
of Radioactive Waste Produced by Radioisotope Users.
(c) Customary Law and General Principles of Law
While there is not complete unanimity of opinion, the general
consensus, according to one observer, is that international customary
law contains no rules of environmental protection.17 Further, those
principles which are recognized by some authorities as customary law
generally apply to questions of liability. There are, however, rules
of customary law and general principles of law relevant to pre-accident
NPS regulation.
The customary rules of state responsibility, territorial sovereignty,
and freedom of the high seas bear upon the use of NPSs. State re-
sponsibility and territorial sovereignty combine to create a restraint
on the abuse of another state's environment. Freedom of the seas
directly implies the non-exhaustive enjoyment or sharing of the sea
environment." Add to these customary rules the general principle
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non leadas (use your property so as not
to injure your neighbor) and the result is a duty to use NPSs as safely
as possible. 9
Professor Gunther Handl asserts that there is an international
duty of prior notification and consultation when planned activities
carry a significant risk of transnational environmental harm.9 In sup-
86. See IAEA Statute, art. III, 8 U.S.T. at 1095-97 T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276
U.N.T.S. at 6.
87. Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Pro-
tection, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 179 (1973).
88. Id.
89. B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9 (1976).
90. Handle, The Environment: International Rights and Responsibilities, in PRO-
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port of his claim he cites Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration"
and several U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.2 If Professor Handl
is correct, states may be obliged to give prelaunch notice and infor-
mation about NPS use. This however assumes that NPS use creates
a significant risk of transnational environmental harm and that con-
trary customary law has not been established by the twenty-four years
of NPS launches without prior notice.
(d) Subsidiary Sources of Law
(i) Decisions of International Tribunals
Two decisions have had an indirect effect on NPS use. Together
the Trail Smelter Arbitration' and the Corfu Channel Case' have placed
upon every state the "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.""5
Although both of these well worn cases dealt with the use of
sovereign territory in a way that harmed the property of another
sovereign state, the principle can be transferred to space craft. Under
the Outer Space Treaty, the Registration Convention, and the Moon
Treaty, a space object retains the nationality of the state of registra-
tion after launch. A space object can therefore be considered for some
purposes to be a piece of sovereign territory. The state of registry
must therefore take measures to prevent harm that its space objects
may cause to the territory of another state.
(ii) Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration)"
The Stockholm Declaration is a collection of principles and recom-
mendations concerning the human environment. The principles are not
binding international law in the formal sense, but they are in some
instances a restatement of customary law 97 and in other instances
evidence of state practice and thought. Three of the principles have
some impact on NPS use.
CEEDINGS OF THE 73RD MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223,
224 (1980).
91. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf., 48/14 (June 5-16, 1972).
92. Handle, supra note 90, at 225.
93. 3 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 1905 (1935).
94. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. 4.
95. Id.
96. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (June 5-16, 1972).
97. Principle 21 is thought by several authorities, including Ian Brownlie, to
be existing customary law. See Brownlie, supra note 87, at 188.




The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances
and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations
as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them
harmless, must be halted in order to ensure that serious
or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The
just struggle of the people of all countries against pollution
should be supported."
The relatively strong language of Principle 6 could render the United
States policy of scattering the radioactive material of returning NPSs
throughout the upper atmosphere illegal.9 However, Principle 6 so
far only represents the thoughts of some states.
Principle 7, which reads: "[s/tates shall take all possible steps
to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life,
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea,""° is similar in effect to Article 25 of the Convention on the High
Seas.' It is different from Article 25 in its broader application. For
NPS use, Principle 7 on its face creates a more compelling duty to
protect against the release of radioactive material from NPSs that
splash into the earth's seas. Principle 7, like Principle 6, is, however,
no more than evidence of state thought.
The third of the Stockholm Principles which bear upon NPS use
is number 21. Principle 21, thought by some observers to be a restate-
ment of customary law,"0 2 reads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment or other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' 3
98. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (June 5-6, 1972).
99. This policy is only in place for nuclear reactors. See Uses of Radio-active
Materials by the United States, supra note 12, at 5.
100. Id.
101. Convention on the High Seas, art. 25, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 520
(1958).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (June 5-16, 1972).
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Principle 21 represents a delicate balance between a state's right to
control matters within its territory and a state's responsibility to en-
sure that these matters do not cause damage outside its territory.'"
The primary impact of Principle 21 is post-accident, reinforcing the
principle of state liability for transnational pollution, discussed below.
For pre-accident use, Principle 21 does what many other previously
discussed rules do, namely create a duty to be careful. It can also
be argued that Principle 21, in its recognition of a state's right to
exploit its own resources, permits the use of NPSs.
B. Post-accident Law
1. Space Law
(a) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Liability Convention)"5
The crash of COSMOS 954 provided an excellent opportunity to
test the utility of the Liability Convention. The test results are not
conclusive, but the examination process has put more flesh on the
bones of the Liability Convention than exists on any of the other space
treaties. The exact role played by the Liability Convention in set-
tling Canada's claim may never be known, but any future NPS acci-
dent settlements will have the COSMOS 954 precedent to follow.
The Liability Convention expands upon Article 7 of the Outer
Space Treaty. The Convention's primary features may be found in
Articles 2 and 3. Under Article 2, a launching state is absolutely liable
for the damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth
or to an aircraft in flight. According to Article 3, if the damage is
caused elsewhere than the surface of the earth, the launching state
is liable only when it is at fault. Under the Convention's scheme, for
damages caused on earth, three elements must be proven: damage,
the presence of a space object, and that damage was caused by the
space object.' 0
When dealing with an NPS and radioactive contamination, the
primary question becomes the definition of damage covered by the
Convention, as it did in the COSMOS 954 incident. COSMOS 954
104. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 423, 485-86 (1973).
105. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, United States-United Kingdom-U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762 [hereinafter cited as Liability Convention].
106. Gorove, COSMOS 954: Issues of Law and Policy, 6 J. SPACE L. 137, 138
(1978).
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caused little physical damage. Its primary harm was in the form of
radioactive residue."7 The cost incurred by Canada was primarily for
the search and clean up of contaminated material. When faced with
Canada's claim for damages, the Soviet Union stated: "That the radia-
tion situation over the entire examined territory judging by the level
of external radiation could be recognized as practically safe for popula-
tion. In similar conditions further search on the Soviet Union's terri-
tory would evidently be discontinued."'0 8 By this statement it appears
that the Soviet Union intended to indirectly point out that it felt
Canada's clean up effort could not be included in a damage claim under
the Liability Convention.
Article 1 defines damage as the "loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of states
or of persons, natural or judicial, or property of international inter-
governmental organizations."'0 9 If a space object powered by an NPS
strikes a person, there is no question but that the launching state
is liable for the resulting personal injuries. But when the NPS leaks
radioactive material, the plain language of Article 1 does not un-
equivocally indicate whether the launching state is liable for the
resulting nuclear injuries, pollution, and clean up efforts.
Authorities who have studied the drafting history of the Liabil-
ity Convention generally agree that personal injuries caused by nuclear
power sources are covered by the Convention."' The history shows
that the inclusion of nuclear injuries was debated at length with the
majority of states supporting its inclusion."' Whether pollution of the
environment and a subsequent clean up effort are included as damages
is less certain. Professor Carl Q. Christol, reasoning that environmental
pollution "can produce an unacceptable interference in valid expecta-
tions for beneficial and peaceful uses and activities in space," believes
that pollution is covered by the Convention."' Also, Jason Reiskind
believes that the settlement of Canada's COSMOS 954 claim for three
million dollars supports the position that "damages to property of a
state" includes nuclear contamination."3 However, Nundasiri Jasen-
107. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 1.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Liability Convention, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2392, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
110. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 548.
111. Id.
112. Christol, Protection of Space From Environmental Harm, 4 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 433, 450-52 (1979).
113. Reiskind, Toward a Responsible Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space-The
Canadian Initiative in the United Nations, 6 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 461, 463 (1981).
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tulyana, a staff member of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), believes that pollution per
se may not be covered and that the question of clean up costs has
to yet be decided by COPUOS." '
A complete and full discussion of the Liability Convention is not
the purpose of this article, but a few more details about the Conven-
tion are in order. The statute of limitation periods found in Article
10 are relevant. A claim must be presented through diplomatic chan-
nels within one year after the date damage was incurred." 5 If the
full extent of the damage is not known, the claim may be revised
within one year after the full extent is known or should have been
known through the exercise of due diligence."'
If an amount which will restore the claimant to the condition
that existed prior to the injury " 7 is not agreed upon within one year,
then a claims commission may be established by the request of either
party under Article 14. The claims commission is to be composed of
three members chosen by the method specified in Article 15. The com-
mission's decision will be binding if the parties so agree, but in all
cases it will be made public."8 A nonbinding decision is to be con-
sidered in good faith."9
(b) Outer Space Treaty"
The Outer Space Treaty contains the general principles upon
which the Liability Convention was built. Article 6 creates interna-
tional responsibility for a state's activities in outer space. Article 7
places international liability on the state which launches, procures the
launch, or allows the launch from its territory of a space object which
causes damage to another State Party. However, after the coming
to force of the Liability Convention, the Outer Space Treaty does little
more than supplement the Liability Convention in this area. Although,
according to Professor Christol, the Outer Space Treaty, by not speci-
fying that an object must reach orbit, creates liability for aborted
launches. 2' This may be significant to NPS use if an aborted launch
results in nuclear contamination.
114. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 546.
115. Liability Convention, art. 10, 24 U.S.T. at 2396, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
116. Id.
117. Liability Convention, art. 12, 24 U.S.T. at 2397, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
118. Liability Convention, art. 19, 24 U.S.T. at 2400, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
119. Id.
120. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
121. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 38, at 797.
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(c) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Rescue Agreement)1"
As with the Liability Convention, the Rescue Agreement played
a major role in the COSMOS 954 incident. The Soviet Union's failure
to ask for the return of the debris from COSMOS 954 was likely
because it wished to avoid the requirements of Article 5, paragraph
five, of the Rescue Agreement.1"
Each contracting state that finds a space object within its ter-
ritory has an obligation to notify the launching state and the Secretary-
General of its presence.'24 Then, if the launching state requests, the
state where the object has been found is to take such steps as are
practical to recover and return the object or its component parts.'25
The catch is that under Article 5, paragraph five, the launching state
is to pay the expenses incurred. Therefore, if the Soviet Union had
asked for the return of COSMOS 954, or what was left of it, the Soviet
Union would have been obligated to pay the expenses incurred.
Paragraph four of Article 5 is of particular relevance to NPS
use. Paragraph four provides that when a contracting state discovers
a hazardous space object in its territory, it may request that the
launching state take immediate steps, under the victim state's direc-
tion, to eliminate the danger. This provision may be particularly im-
portant if an NPS leaks radioactive material after landing in a state
that does not possess the technical ability to deal with the danger.
Should a victim state not request aid from the launching state, the
liability of the launching state is not lessened.12 Yet the Soviet Union
insisted that it had a duty-the equivalent of a right-to assist in
the clean up of COSMOS 954 under the Rescue Agreement."
(d) Moon Treaty
Article 14 of the Moon Treaty repeats Article 6 of the Outer
Space Treaty in stating that States which are Parties to the Moon
Treaty bear international responsibility for their national activities
122. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, The Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature April 22, 1968,
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter cited as Rescue Agreement].
123. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 2.
124. Rescue Agreement, art. 5, para. 1, 672 U.N.T.S. at 122.
125. Rescue Agreement, art. 5, paras. 2 and 3, 672 U.N.T.S. at 122.
126. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 2.
127. Id.
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on the moon. For NPS use this emphasizes the responsibility for any
harm caused by an NPS on the moon.
2. Environmental Law
(a) International Conventions
There are four conventions which deal with environmental
damage caused by nuclear power use. Of the four conventions, three
are not in force and the remaining convention has not been ratified
by any of the space powers.
The Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna
Convention), 28 which has not come into force, contains several provi-
sions that could be very relevant to NPS use. The Vienna Conven-
tion contains the following principles applicable to the operation of
a "nuclear installation:" (1) absolute liability of the facility operator
(strict liability) (Art. 4); (2) a limitation on the operator's liability (Art.
5); (3) a statute of limitations (Art. 6); and (4) mandatory insurance
coverage (Art. 7)." It is very possible, though, that NPSs do not fit
within the definition of a nuclear installation. Section 1(j)(i) of Article
1 defines a "nuclear installation" as "any nuclear reactor other than
one with which a means of sea or air transportation is equipped for
use as a source of power, whether for propulsion thereof or for any
other purpose."'" During the negotiations of the Convention on Inter-
national Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, it was decid-
ed to include coverage of nuclear damage because of the uncertainty
over whether the Vienna Convention covered NPS use. 31
Of the three remaining conventions, the two that deal directly
with nuclear liability are similar to the Vienna Convention. Both the
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
(Third Party Liability Convention)'" and the Convention on the Liabil-
ity of Operators of Nuclear Ships (Ship Operators Convention)"3 create
absolute liability and limit collectable damages. The Third Party Con-
vention is in force, but the Ship Operators Convention is not.




131. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 38, at 799.
132. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
O.E.E.C. Doc. No. C (60), at 93 (1960).
133. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, reprinted in
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963).
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The remaining convention with relevance to NPS liability is the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention.'" Article 235 of that convention reads
"States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obliga-
tions concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law. '"'
Should the Law of the Sea Convention come into force, Article 235
may add to and extend international liability for leaks of radioactive
material over the high seas. Under current international law, damages
can be collected only when an international entity has been harmed
or when an international entity represents a damaged non-international
entity. In most cases this menas that a state or one of its citizens
must be damaged. However, under the Law of the Sea Convention,
international liability may be extended to damage to the marine envi-
ronment of the high seas alone.
Article 157, paragraph two,"3 of the Law of the Seas Conven-
tion, enumerates the powers of the Authority.' Among those powers
are "such incidental powers, consistent with this Convention, as are
implicit in and necessary for the exercise of those powers and func-
tions with respect to activities in the Area."'" The Authority may
exercise those powers to protect the Area's environment under Article
215.'" It could be reasonably argued that the Authority's powers in-
clude enforcement of the international liability recognized by Article
235. If this line of reasoning is correct, states might be liable, in some
fashion or another, for radioactive material released by an NPS return-
ing to earth over the high seas Area.
(b) Customary Law and General Principles of Law
Authorities agree that states bear international liability for
transnational pollution resulting from a violation of international law." °
For example, a state would be internationally liable for nuclear damage
resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon in earth orbit. There
134. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, part IX, art.
235, Responsibility and Liability, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Law of the Sea Convention].
135. Id.
136. Id. at Part XI, Art. 157.
137. The "Authority" is defined by Article 1 as "the International Sea-Bed
Authority." The "General Provisions" governing the Authority can be found in section
4 of Part XI.
138. Law of the Sea Convention, Part XI, Art. 157, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122
(Oct. 9, 1982).
139. Id. at Part XII, Art 215.
140. Handle, supra note 90, at 229.
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is, however, debate over whether states are strictly liable for transna-
tional pollution in the absence of a violation of international law.
Mr. Ian Brownlie argues that strict liability exists for transna-
tional pollution.' He maintains that while a certain amount of contami-
nation is tolerated, the Corfu Channel Case,' the Trail Smelter
Arbitration,' and state practice concerning the responsibility for
harboring armed bands demonstrates that states are strictly liable
for harm caused to other states or their nationals.'" The majority of
writers do not find the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the Corfu Chan-
nel Case to authoritatively establish strict liability for transnational
pollution injury though.'' The majority's position is supported by the
recent debates within the International Law Commission drafting ses-
sions for Article 23 of its draft articles on state responsibility.'
While strict liability for transnational pollution may not yet ex-
ist, strict liability for harm caused by ultrahazardous activities may
constitute a "general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. " '7
The Canadian Government expressed this opinion in its note claiming
damages of the Soviet Union for the COSMOS 954 incident.'
Another principle that might constitute customary law, which
is relevant to NPS use, is the concept of self help.' On behalf of
all humanity, a nation possessing the technical means to reorbit a
faltering NPS might follow the example of the British Government
in the Torrey Canyon incident and mitigate the results of a potential
disaster. The United States Space Transport System now creates
this possibility.
(c) Subsidiary Sources of Law
The most common subsidiary source of international environmen-
tal law; namely, the decisions of international tribunals, have been
141. Brownlie, supra note 87, at 180.
142. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. 4.
143. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1935).
144. Brownlie, supra note 87, at 180.
145. Handle, supra note 90, at 229.
146. Id.
147. "[Gjeneral principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are a source
of international law recognized by the International Court of Justice. Art. 38(1)(c),
Statutes of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933.
148. Handle, supra note 90, at 230.
149. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 38, at 809, quoting DeSaussure, An International
Right to Reorbit Earth-threatening Satellites, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 95 (1979).
150. Brownlie, supra note 87, at 186.
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greatly overworked. The Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United
States and Canada,"' and the Corfu Channel Case between the United
Kingdom and Albania"5 2 have been mandatory material for every com-
mentary on state responsibility and environmental law; yet, there is
no uniform reading of their value. Some authorities cite them as con-
clusive proof of state responsibility for transnational pollution, while
other authorities find them inconclusive. Nonetheless, in their general
terms, they must be read as supporting the principle of state respon-
sibility for damage caused by NPSs.
Domestic law, as either a subsidiary source of law or an indica-
tion of state practice, has relevance here. This is particularly so when
it is the domestic law of a nation using NPSs. Under the United States'
National Environmental Protection Act," several administrative agen-
cies assess the potential environmental effect of a proposed NPS. Fur-
ther, every NPS must be personally approved by the President prior
to launch."
A potential, but not yet contributing, source of law is the United
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). Formed by the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and adopted by
General Assembly Resolution," the UNEP is basically designed to
coordinate international pollution policy and aid programs to fight
transnational pollution. As of yet it is not the source of international
law effecting the use of NPSs. However, if operating as designed,
the UNEP could aid in the clean up of NPS accidents.'
IV. CURRENT EFFORTS TO REGULATE
While Canada was still involved in the search and clean up effort
following the crash of COSMOS 954, the Scientific and Technical Sub-
committee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) convened on February 13, 1978. Canada im-
mediately brought the incident to the Subcommittee's attention. Con-
cerned about the lack of safety standards for NPS use, Canada, along
with eight other nations, submitted a proposal for the creation of a
151. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1935).
152. U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. 4.
153. 42 U.S.C. sec. 4321-61 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
154. Hosenball, supra note 57, at 122.
155. U.N. Gen. Ass. 2997 (XXVII), December 15, 1972.
156. The UNEP has four operating bodies, which are: (1) the Governing Council
of the United Nations Environmental Program; (2) the Environment Secretariat; (3)
the Environment Fund; and (4) the Environment Co-ordination Board.
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working group within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee to
consider the safety issues involved in the use of NPSs and to create
operation standards."' By resolution 33/16, the General Assembly en-
dorsed Canada's proposal and established the Working Group on the
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (Working Group) on
November 10, 1978. The Working Group held its first meeting in
February of 1979.
A. The Working Group
The Working Group met three times between 1979 and 1981.
At these meetings the Working Group focused on three issues: safety,
search and recovery, and notification. During discussions of each issue,
two groups with different perspectives developed. The first group,
lead by Canada, pressed for the creation of detailed standards. The
second group, composed of the Eastern European delegations, was
of the opinion that existing regulations sufficiently governed the use
of NPSs.'
During the three years many positions were put forth. Some
states called for notice to all other states prior to the launch of an
NPS, while others proposed a moratorium until NPS use could be
fully regulated. 5 9 Still others suggested that a limit on the number
of NPSs allowed in orbit at one time be set.'" At the conclusion of
its third meeting the Working Group issued a report which generally
took the middle ground. Believing its work to be completed, the Work-
ing Group then decided to cancel further meetings.
The highlights and conclusions of the 1981 report of the Working
Group can be summarized as follows:
(1) The safety of radioisotope systems was being
assured by "designing them to contain with a high probability
of success the radio-isotope for normal and credible abnor-
mal conditions."
(2) The safe operation of nuclear reactors can be
greatly improved if they are only started and operated in
157. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 533 n.42.
158. Reiskind, supra note 113, at 465.
159. W. Wirin, supra note 4, at 4.
160. Id.
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high orbits which allow the radioactive material to decay
to safe levels. If used in low earth orbits, the safe opera-
tion of NPSs depends on the ability to boost them into
higher orbit after their missions are completed.
(3) Any release of radioactive material into the earth's
atmosphere should conform with standards created by the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
(4) Missions employing an NPS should take the radia-
tion protection methods recommended by ICRP publication
number 26.
(5) States launching an NPS should conduct an assess-
ment of radiation risks prior to launch.
(6) As recommended in ICRP publication No. 26, the
annual dose for nuclear industry workers should not exceed
50 mSv (5 rem) and for the public 5 mSv from all man-made
sources.
(7) States should be informed of the possible reentry
of an NPS at the earliest possible time. The following format
for notification should be used:
1. System parameters
1.1 Name of launching State or States including the
address of the authority which may be contacted for addi-
tional information or assistance in case of accident.
1.2 International designation.
1.3 Date and territory or location of launch.
1.4 Information required for best prediction of orbit
lifetime, trajectory, and impact.
1.5 General function of spacecraft.
2. Information on the radiological risk of nuclear
power source(s)
2.1 Type of NPS: radio-isotopic/reactor.
2.2 The probable physical form, amount and general
radiological characteristics of the fuel and contaminated
and/or activated components likely to reach the ground. The
term "fuel" refers to the nuclear material used as the source
of heat or power.
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(8) NPSs can be safely used if all recommended safety
measures are taken. 81
On December 15, 1983, the General Assembly asked the Working
Group to reconvene."2 The important points in the report of the Work-
ing Group's 1984 meeting are as follows:
(1) Some delegations expressed the view that inter-
national criteria for design and operations of an NPS should
be established.
(2) Some delegations expressed the view that nuclear
reactors should only be used in orbits with a life time of
at least 300 years after reactor shut-down. Further, that
nuclear reactors in a lower orbit should be boosted to the
300 year height in all cases. Also, the planned disposal
method should never include dispersion of radioactive
material into the earth's atmosphere.
(3) Some delegations expressed the view that compli-
ance with ICRP recommendations should not include pre-
launch notification. 18 3
The fourth session of the Working Group (1984 meeting) failed
to produce recommendations for the regulation of NPSs. The Group
requested that member states submit their views and suggestions for
consideration by the Group during its fifth session on, among other
issues, the following: (1) "[q]uestions of assessing the safety and
reliability of the use of nuclear power sources;" (2) "[m]ethods, form
and frequency of communication of notification;" and, (3) "[emergency
procedures and action plans in case of unplanned re-entry of NPS." '' 1
From the list of issues the Working Group is considering requesting
input on, it is apparent that no real progress has been made and that
basic disagreements remain.
B. Work of the Legal Sub-Committee
Although Canada and thirteen other co-sponsors submitted a
working paper to the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS in 1978,
detailed discussions did not take place until 1981. This delay was due
in part to the opinion of some states that the Legal Sub-Committee
161. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.126 (1980).
162. G.A. Res. 38/80, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983).
163. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/336 (1984).
164. Id.
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should wait for the Working Group to finish its work, and in part
the delay was due to delaying tactics employed by Eastern European
delegations. The Eastern European delegations argued that there
already existed a framework of international rules for the use of
NPSs."'
When the Legal Sub-Committee finally addressed the NPS issue
it followed the lead of Canadian working papers and focused on four
issues. Those issues are:
(1) Safety measures: The establishment of effective
international standards, safeguards, and limitations.
(2) Notification: the establishment of notification
obligations at various stages in the use of NPSs in space.
(3) Emergency assistance: the development of inter-
national legal measures for search, recovery, and clean up
operations in case of a reentry of an NPS.
(4) Liability for damage caused by the use of NPSs."'
Still, the Canadian effort met with stiff resistance. The Soviet
Union, as the only nation presently using nuclear reactors, resisted
changes in existing law. 6 7 Further, the Canadian position that pre-
sent NPS use creates unacceptable risks met with opposition from
several states. The opposition asserted that the conclusion of the
Working Group that NPSs can be safely used was correct."8 Faced
with this opposition, Canada revised its position. Canada now admits
that a general legal regime exists, but asserts that it needs clarifica-
tion and amplification.' 6' Canada has also taken a pragmatic approach
toward its former position that states which receive no benefits from
NPS use should bear none of the risks from their use. Realizing that
it must obtain the cooperation of the space capable nations, Canada
is now prepared to modify this position. 7'
During the Legal Sub-Committee's work on the issue, one agreed
text has been produced for notification in the case of a reentering
NPS. So far, though, no agreement has been reached on a form for
165. Reiskind, supra note 113, at 465.
166. Jasentuliyana, supra note 39, at 538-39.
167. C. CHRISTOL. supra note 38, at 784.
168. Id. at 789.
169. Reiskind, supra note 113, at 468.
170. Id. at 470.
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the text.171 The text is very similar to the notice format developed
by the Working Group. 72
Some of the highlights of the Legal Sub-Committee's discussions
are as follows:
(1) Canada proposed supplementing the liability pro-
visions of the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention
to clarify that states are responsible for "indirect" damages
(clean up) caused by NPSs. Other states felt this was not
necessary.
(2) Debate, inconclusive to date, over the obligation
of a launching state to render search and clean up aid took
place. Some states have put forth the view that a launching
state has the right to investigate the crash of an NPS.
(3) Debate over the need to supplement existing inter-
national law continued between the Canadian led group and
the Soviet led group."'
171. Jasentuiyana, Review of the Work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, 12 J. SPACE L. 52, 55 (1984).
172. Any State launching a space object with nuclear power sources on board
should timely inform States concerned in the event the space object malfunctions and
there is a risk of re-entry of radioactive materials to the earth. The information should
be in accordance with the following format:
1. System parameters:
1.1 name of launching State, including the address of the authority
which may be contacted for additional information or assistance in case
of accident;
1.2 international designation;
1.3 date and territory or location of launch;
1.4 information required for best prediction of orbit lifetime, tra-
jectory and impact region; and
1.5 general function of spacecraft.
2. Information on the radiological risk of nuclear power source(s):
2.1 type of nuclear power source: radio-isotopic/reactor; and
2.2 the probable physical form, amount and general radiological
characteristics of the fuel and contaminated and/or activated components
likely to reach the ground. The term 'fuel' refers to the nuclear material
used as the source of heat or power.
This information should also be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
173.. Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Twenty-First Ses-
sion, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/305 (Feb. 24, 1982), summarized at 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
20) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/37/20 (1982).
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V. CONCLUSION AND A SUGGESTION
Space borne nuclear power sources are here to stay. Their util-
ity is far too high and their risk too low to realistically expect space
faring nations to give them up. Aside from their military uses, which
is likely the reason a ban on NPS use has not been seriously con-
sidered, NPSs have great potential. For example, the Center for Space
Policy estimates that by the year 2000, annual revenues from material
processing could be over twenty-five billion dollars.' The power to
operate material processing operations in space will likely be supplied
in part by NPSs.
Faced with this reality, the international community should focus
its attention on ensuring the safe use of NPSs and the existence of
an equitable liability system for any NPS accidents. The question then
becomes whether existing law meets these objectives.
It is clear from the Outer Space Treaty and customary law that
NPS use is not prohibited. While some nations have suggested in
COPUOS discussions that NPS use should be temporarily discontinued,
such suggestions do not amount to the formal protests necessary to
render NPS use illegal. Freedom of access and use of space, coupled
with twenty-four years of use, has established the right to launch
NPSs. It is also clear that, as much as some states would wish to
the contrary, there is no requirement of notice prior to launch. Even
if there is a customary law requirement of prior notice for ultrahazard-
ous activities, as claimed by Professor Gunther Handl, it can be reason-
ably argued that the use of NPSs does not constitute an ultrahazardous
activity.
The Outer Space Treaty and customary environmental law do
require that states take every reasonable safety measure when using
NPSs. If reentry into the earth's atmosphere is planned, whether
shortly after launch or hundreds of years later, under Article 25 of
the Convention on the High Seas, NPS users must attempt to meet
IAEA safety standards. If the safety measures suggested by the
COPUOS Working Group on NPS use are taken, meeting IAEA safe-
ty standards should prove to be no problem.
If safety measures fail, what is a launching state's liability for
the resulting damage? Personal injury and direct property damage,
including radiation injury, are clearly covered by the Liability Con-
174. Space Commercialization Group Includes Non-Aerospace Firms, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 4, 1985, at 20.
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vention. Liability for damages to the environment and resulting clean
up measures is not certain. However, it is possible to argue that states
are responsible for environmental damage and clean up measures
which result from NPS use. The argument is as follows:
First, under customary law, states are responsible for
environmental harm caused by their breaches of interna-
tional law;
second, the reentry of an NPS, without prior consent,
violates a state's sovereign air space, as established by Arti-
cle 1 of the Chicago Convention, thereby creating a violation
of international law;
third, the COSMOS 954 settlement serves as precedent
for the inclusion of clean up liability.
It is clear from the preceding survey that there is insufficient
law specific to NPS use. This is unfortunate, because the safe use
of NPSs in outer space will demand tangible and detailed regulation.
With this in mind, the following is proposed. In the short run, for
NPSs, a system of technical regulations similar to those created by
ICAO in its Annexs should be established. International Standards
and Recommended Practices could be created by an inter-governmental
organization, for example the IAEA, to guide the use of NPSs. In
the long run, however, NPS regulation will need more comprehen-
sive treatment. Also, other areas, such as liability rules and traffic
rules for space, will require technical as well as legal guidelines.
Therefore, it is suggested that the international community establish
an organization for space tailored after ICAO. ICAO, for all its flaws,
is one of, if not the best, inter-governmental problem solving organiza-
tion. The development of space, like the development of commercial
aviation, would benefit from one central organization charged with
providing technical and legal guidelines.
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